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B.: Separate Recovery in Stockholder's Derivative Suit
STUDENT NOTES
two different ways.12 No decision has hinted that the presence
of both terms might supplement the force and effect of one of
them standing alone. Thus a covenant to remove all "minable and
merchantable" coal -would have no greater legal signifiance than
a covenant merely to remove all "minable" coal, or all "merchantable" coal. The operator expects to remove, and should be
bound to remove under leases providing for a tonnage royalty,
all coal minable at a profit (to avoid incidental argument, say
profit under "normal conditions"), and use of the term minable
or merchantable, or both, is but a means whereby the goal of
fair and reasonable production may be better secured. Both
terms qualify the operator's expected profit but can it be said
that the influence of one is greater than that of the other? It
is believed not.
G.S. B.

SEPARATE RECOVERY IN STOCKHOLDER'S
DERIVATIVE SUIT
The nature of the stockholder's derivative suit has already
been discussed at length in an earlier issue of the Law Quarterly.'
The problem now arises as to whether there can properly be a
separate or partial recovery in the derivative suit, and on this
controversial issue the authorities are divided. On the one side,
the courts are persuasive in their argument that to permit separate recovery is to defeat the rights of creditors of the corporation and to disregard the fiction of corporate entity.2 "Otherwise
than in name the action is by the corporation, and if relief be
obtained it belongs, not to the stockholder bringing the action
but to the corporation.'"' However, on the other side, the proponents of a separate recovery claim that there are instances where
substantially all other stockholders are defendants in pari delicto
with the wrongdoers, and it would be unjust to grant a judgment
for the benefit of the corporation. And similarly where the wrongdoers are still in control, circuity of action and multiplied litiga12 For example, Tressler Coal Min. Co. v. Klefeld, 24 S. E. (2d)
(W. Va. 1943).

98, 101

1 Note (1938) 44 W. VA. L. Q. 129.
2 Eshleman v. Keenan, 22 Del. Ch. 82, 187 Atl. 25 (1938); Dawklns v.
Mitchell, 149 La. 1038, 90 So. 396 (1922); Harris v. Pearsall, 116 Misc.
366, 190 N. Y. Supp. 61 (3921); STEVENS, CORPOnAToNs (1936) 659-660.
33 FLETH ., PRiVA.TE CORPoRAriONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 5953.
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tion would thus be avoided.'
After a study of these contrary
views, one is disposed to conclude that in the so-called "modern
cases" the trend is to permit partial recovery under very special
and exceptional circumstances.
In a recent West Virginia case, Chaunis v. Laing, the court
granted a separate recovery.' The corporate wrongs in that instance amounted to a diversion or appropriation of the assets of the
defendant corporation by its officers and directors, and secondly, the
failure to offer to the corporation a corporate advantage, i. e.,
the opportunity to establish a sales department. It is well settled
that the first mentioned wrong is ultra vires6 The authority of
directors and officers is normally limited to intra vires business
and consequently directors may not bind the corporation by
authorizing ultra vires transactions. The failure to offer to the
corporation a corporate advantage is in fact a breach of the fiduciary relationship of the directors to the shareholders. The dispersion of stock ownership in the modern corporation and the
effective control of corporate affairs being placed in the hands
of a few strategically situated officers has led more and more to
an increased amount of such directorate malfeasance. Because
of this everwidening breach between ownership on one hand and
control and management on the other, the extent to which corporate officials may benefit personally from their positions has
become a serious legal problem.7 Where the corporate property
is misused by directors and such property can be traced, many
authorities recommend that a trust be imposed for the benefit of
the corporation." But whether a trust or an accounting of the
profits is ordered, there will in every instance be relief for the
nonassenting shareholder. The policy underlying this "corporate-shareholder" remedy appears to be quite sound, the essence
being to take away from directors the temptation to compete with
the corporation for advantageous contracts and business opportunities. The courts speak loosely of "ratification" of the ultra vires
acts by the majority shareholders. But it is well settled that
4 Equitable Trust Co. of Columbia v. Columbia National Bank, 145 S. C.
91, 142 S. E. 811 (1928); Arnim v. American Tubeworks, 188 Mass. 515, 74
N. E. 680 (1905); Brown v. DeYoung, 167 Ill. 549, 47 N. E. 863 (1897);
Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R. I. 146, 32 Atl. 339 (1895); Note (1937) 51 HAnv.
L. REv. 164.
5Chaunis v. Laing, 23 S. E. (2d) 628 (W. Va. 1943).
6 STEvENs, CoaRTIoNs 254-255; 7 FLET~h-ER, PRiVATE CoRPoRAiTx0s §
3401.
7 Note (1936) 84 U. op PA. L. REv. 1008.
8 Gilmore v. Gilore Drug Co., 279 Pa. 193, 123 Atl. 730 (1924).
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there can be no corporate ratification of such acts,' and what the
majority shareholders did in the instant case was to "waive"
their rights of recourse against the director-wrongdoers. It is
also settled that a so-called "ratification" or "acquiescence" by
a majority of the stockholders of a misappropriation of corporate
funds does not bind a dissenting minority stockholder. 10
The minority shareholders may require directors and other
officers to account for profits made by the use of the company's
assets and for any money made by a breach of trust. Setting
aside the transaction and requiring that an accounting of profits
be made is the common form of relief. Here the majority shareholders were active defendants or "ratifiers" and as such were
not entitled to any recovery; therefore the court awarded a separate personal judgment in favor of the minority shareholder. Relief
in the form of a separate dividend recovery or a constructive
trust was not discussed.
The problem of the present case is not that of Young v.
Columbia Oil Co.," since here there is a complete corporate cause
of action, nor is the issue of Eschlenan v. Keenan apparently
argued.
-owever, the result reached in Chatnis v. Laing 1" is a
desirable one and adds substantially to West Virginia corporation law. Partial recovery is, in effect, an equitable short-cut
and is commendable in exceptional cases where the corporation
is solvent and creditors' rights will not be defeated. Legal writers
have in many instances despaired of ever formulating a set of
legal rules to protect the collective interests of shareholders and
creditors. The alternative is the evolution of a code of ethics
fostered by business men themselves. Whether such would be
advisable is a debatable issue and for the present
the most favorable solution is to make the best possible use of the now available legal machinery.1
D. V. B.
9 7 FLETCHER, CoRPORATiois

9 3401; STEVENS, CoPoRAioNs 608.
10 3 FLETCHEr,, PriVATE CORtPORATIONS § 1104; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 274.
11 Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S. E. 678 (1931). Note

(1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 158 (not a complete corporate cause of action, and
director must offer advantage to shareholder as well as to the corporation).
12 Eshleman v. Keenan, 22 Del. Ch. 82, 187 Al. 25 (1938) (issue of partial
recovery not apparently argued by counsel).
13 Note (1936) 84 U. or PA. L. REV. at 1017.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1943

3

